Karen Golay, et al. v. Washington City Corporation, Wheeler Machinery Co. : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2003
Karen Golay, et al. v. Washington City Corporation,
Wheeler Machinery Co. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jeffrey N. Starkey; Bryan J. Pattison; Durham, Jones & Pinegar; Attorneys for Intervenor; Joseph C.
Rust; Kesler & Rust Attorney for Defendant/Appellee.
Bruce R. Baird; Baird & Jones; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Golay v. Washington City Corporation, No. 20030528 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4414
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KARENGOLAY,e?a/., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Case No. 20030528-CA 
v. 
WASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
WHEELER MACHINERY CO. 
Intervenor. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
JEFFREY N. STARKEY, ESQ. 
BRYAN J. PATTISON, ESQ. 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR 
192 East 200 North, 3rd Floor 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
JOSEPH C. RUST, Esq. 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 S State St 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
BRUCE R.BAIRD #0176 
BAIRD & JONES, L.C. 
299 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
AUG 06 200* 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KARENGOLAY,e/a/., : 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Case No. 20030528-CA 
v. 
WASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendants and Appellees, : 
WHEELER MACHINERY CO. : 
Intervenor. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE FIFTH DISTRICT COURT 
BRUCE R.BAIRD #0176 
BAIRD & JONES, L.C. 
JEFFREY N. STARKEY, ESQ. 299 South Main Street, Suite 1300 
BRYAN J. PATTISON, ESQ. Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
DURHAM, JONES & PINEGAR Attorneys for the Plaintiffs/Appellants 
192 East 200 North, 3rd Floor 
St. George, UT 84770 
Attorneys for Intervenor 
JOSEPH C. RUST, Esq. 
KESLER & RUST 
2000 Beneficial Life Tower 
36 S State St 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES Hi 
INTRODUCTION 1 
ARGUMENT 2 
POINT I: THE CITY FAILED TO FOLLOW ITS OWN RULES 
REGARDING NOTICE AND CITIZENS WERE PREJUDICED BY THIS 
FAILURE 2 
POINT II: THE CITIZENS DID NOT FAIL TO EXHAUST THEIR 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 6 
POINT III: THE CITIZENS' CLAIMS ARE NOT MOOT 8 
CONCLUSION 11 
ii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases 
Burkettv. Schwendiman, 773 P.2d42(Utah 1989) 10 
City of New Orleans v. Bd. ofComm'rs, 694 So.2d 975 (La. Ct. App. 1996) 9 
Collins v. Sandy Bd. of Adjustment, 2002 UT 77 10 
Collins v. Sandy Bd. of Adjustment, 2000 UT App 371 10 
Culbertson v. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Salt Lake County, 2001 UT 108 9-10 
Dairy Product Servs., Inc. v. CityofWellsville, 2000 UT 18 4, 5 
Dreikausen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 11A N.E.2d 193 (N.Y. 2002) 9 
Ellis v. Swensen, 2001 UT 101 11 
Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10 4-5 
McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190 (Utah 1974) 10 
Mernish v. H.A. Folson & Associates, 646 P.2d 731 (Utah 1982) 10 
Naylorv. Salt Lake City, 410 P.2d 3000 (Utah 1966) 5-6 
Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT7 7 
Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr., Inc. v. West Jordan City, 2000 UT App 49 8 
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City ofSpringville, 
1999 UT 25 2 
State v. Sims, 881 P.2d 840 (Utah 1994) 10 
Tolmanv. Salt Lake County, 20 Utah 2d 310 (Utah 1968) 4 
Wells v. Lodge Props., Inc., 976 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1998) 9 
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1986) 9 
Statutes 
§ 10-9-407(2), U.C.A. 7 
Local Ordinances 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance §3-6 2 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance §8-3 2 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance §8-6 7 
iii 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KAREN GOLAY, etal, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
V. 
WASHINGTON CITY CORPORATION, 
Defendants and Appellees, 
WHEELER MACHINERY CO. 
Intervenor. 
Case No. 20030528-CA 
Plaintiffs/Appellants (the "Citizens") submit the following Reply Brief in 
further support of their appeal in this matter. 
INTRODUCTION 
Nothing in the Briefs filed by either Washington City (the "City") nor by 
Intervenor Wheeler Machinery ("Wheeler") contradicts the central facts of this 
case: the zoning ordinances of the City required notice to the Citizens of the 
Planning Commission's consideration of a conditional use permit for Wheeler, no 
such notice was given and because of that the Citizens were denied an opportunity 
to argue to the City Council for different conditions because they didn't know of 
the Planning Commission's decision and thus could not appeal it to the Council. 
1 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CITY FAILED TO FOLLOW ITS 
OWN RULES REGARDING NOTICE 
AND CITIZENS WERE PREJUDICED 
BY THIS FAILURE 
The plain language of the City's Zoning Ordinances at issue in this case 
conclusively establishes the Citizens' claim. "Notice of Planning Commission 
meetings1 shall be mailed to all property owners . . . within a 300 foot radius of 
any property for which an action of the Planning Commission is being requested" 
Washington City Zoning Ordinance, Chapter 8, §8-3 (emphasis added).2 The 
Ordinance does not specify whether the meeting is for a hearing or not - only that 
if a meeting is held where an action may be taken then notice is required. 
The City argues that this failure is not significant because the Citizens have 
not established how the City's decision would have been different, pursuant to the 
standard announced in Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of 
Springville, 1999 UT 25 at Tflj 29-31. The City claims that it is not enough for the 
Citizens to allege that they could have argued for different conditions. Of course 
it is, at least under the facts of this case. 
1
 Note that the Ordinances do not require notice for only public "hearings" but, 
instead, for the much more broad term of "meetings" at which "an action [ ] is being 
requested." 
2
 Section 3-6 of the Washington City Ordinances (regarding meetings of the 
Commission) also has the exact same language regarding and requiring notice. 
2 
The point of the Ordinance is to give residents of the City notice of 
Planning Commission meetings so they can be aware of decisions being made that 
affect them at least, in part, so that they can appeal such decisions to the City 
Council. Therefore, since the Citizens were not given notice of the September 4, 
2004 meeting of the Planning Commission where Wheeler's conditional use 
permit was granted they could not have appealed the matter to the City Council 
where they would have been heard regarding potential conditions to be imposed 
on Wheeler's conditional use permit. The Citizens have thus been prejudiced by 
the City's failure to follow its Ordinances. 
The City likewise claims that the Planning Commission took the Citizens 
claims into account when it issued a conditional use permit. Whether that is true 
or not (and it was established in the Citizens' Initial Brief that is was not true - that 
the Planning Commission's first set of hearings were all about denial instead of 
potential conditions) is irrelevant. Had the Citizens known of the Planning 
Commission hearing and decision they would have appealed the decision and 
would have been entitled to have their concerns considered by the City Council. 
The Citizens would have been able to argue to the City Council for conditions that 
are more conducive to coexistence between the Citizens and Wheeler. It is clear 
since the Citizens were not given the opportunity to be heard regarding conditions 
for coexistence that the Citizens have been denied their rights under the City's 
Zoning Ordinance. 
3 
In support of the City's position that the Zoning Ordinance could be 
disregarded and notice was not required, the City cites Tolman v. Salt Lake 
County, 20 Utah 2d 310 (Utah 1968). However the quote the City uses in reality 
supports the Citizens reasoning: 
An elementary and fundamental requirement of due 
process in any proceeding which is to be accorded 
finality is notice reasonably calculated, under all the 
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the 
pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity 
to present their objections. * * * A * * * [sic] and it 
must afford reasonable time to those interested to 
make their appearance. 
Id. at 317-318 (emphasis added). 
The test in Tolman is not met in this case. Because the Citizens were not 
given any notice of the September 4, 2002 Planning Commission meeting as far as 
the Citizens were concerned Wheeler's project had been rejected. They deserved 
notice of the meeting where Wheeler's conditional use was back on the table after 
the first decision of the District Court so that they could protect their rights. 
The City also cites Harper v. Summit County, 2001 UT 10, and Dairy 
Product Servs., Inc. v. City ofWellsville, 2000 UT 18, in support of its position 
that since this was not a public hearing, the Citizens had no right to notice. 
However, Harper compels the opposite conclusion (not to re-mention the fact that 
the City's Zoning Ordinance absolutely requires the notice): 
Because the planning commission is not required to 
participate in the application or issuance of these 
documents and because their issuance is merely an 
4 
administrative action, the topic is not one required to 
be discussed on an open meeting . . . 
Mat^[38. 
Since issuing a conditional use permit, which is what happened during the 
September 4, 2002 meeting, requires the input of the Planning Commission, it is 
not merely an administrative decision; it is one that requires an open meeting (and 
notice to the Citizens). Moreover in Wellsville, the Plaintiff had notice of all the 
meetings where decisions about their business were made, unlike this case where 
the Citizens were given no notice of the September 4, 2002 meeting. Thus, neither 
Harper or Wellsville are helpful in evaluating the legal merits of this case. 
As the City clearly acknowledges, there is no dispute that the Citizens were 
not given the notice required pursuant to the City's Ordinance. The City makes 
much of the fact that the Citizens participated in earlier hearings about Wheeler's 
conditional use permit (which led to the denial of the conditional use permit that 
was later overturned) claiming that such participation is an adequate substitute for 
their participation at the Planning Commission hearing. The City's Ordinance 
simply does not allow for such substitute participation to count as real 
participation. 
The City cites Naylor v. Salt Lake City Corp., 410 P.2d 300 (Utah 1966) in 
support of its position that participation in one hearing is the same as participation 
in all subsequent hearings. Naylor however does not support that argument and is 
5 
not helpful in analyzing the Citizens claim against the City. In Naylor, as opposed 
to this case, the plaintiffs participated in the hearing. 
Equally unhelpful in this case is the City's repeated assertion (without any 
legal support) that the Citizens have a duty to outline what conditions they would 
request that have not been imposed. The fact is that the Citizens had a right to 
notice of the Planning Commission hearing so that they could have appealed that 
decision to the City Council where they could have made their concerns known 
and argued for different conditions. 
All of the arguments by the City attempt to distract this Court from the 
plain language of the Ordinance. On September 4, 2002 the Planning Commission 
was making a decision on conditions for Wheeler's conditional use permit, and 
therefore notice was required to be mailed to the Citizens. Q.E.D. 
POINT II 
THE CITIZENS DID NOT FAIL TO 
EXHAUST THEIR 
ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES 
Because the Citizens were not given notice of the September 4, 2002 
Planning Commission meeting and were unaware of the decision the Planning 
Commission made regarding Wheeler,3 they were unable to appeal that decision to 
the City Council. It is more than ironic that the City continues to argue that it is 
okay for it to ignore the Ordinance concerning notice, while at the same time 
As noted above, as far as the Citizens were concerned the project had been killed 
when both the Planning Commission and City Council denied Wheeler's conditional 
use permit. 
6 
attempting to hold the Citizens liable for the Ordinance regarding an appeal of the 
September 4, 2002 Planning Commission decision. It is absurd for the City to 
claim that it is not liable to follow Ordinances that it wrote, but everyone else is 
liable to follow the same Ordinances even if they didn't know of any action that 
affected them. 
The City attempts to have this Court believe that the Citizens chose to go to 
Court instead of appealing the decision of the Planning Commission to the City 
Council Since the Citizens were not aware of the Planning Commission's 
decision within the ten-day timeframe the City imposes for appeals to the City 
Council the Citizens were forced into the only venue left to protect their rights -
the judiciary. The applicability of the ten-day appeal rule outlined in §8-6 of the 
City Ordinances, and the appeal process detailed in the state code at §10-9-407(2), 
U.C.A.. providing administrative remedies that should be exhausted before filing 
suit, are logically contingent upon having had notice of the action from which an 
appeal would be taken. 
This case is completely distinct from Patterson v. American Fork City, 
2003 UT 7, where the plaintiffs made a choice to go to Court rather than follow 
the administrative remedies specifically provided by American Fork's zoning 
ordinance. Here the Citizens would have been happy to have appealed to the City 
Council, and if they had had the notice required under the Ordinance of the 
Planning Commission's September 4, 2002 meeting they would have done so. 
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However, since the Citizens did not have the requisite notice they cannot be bound 
to follow other portions of the Ordinance. 
In the same way, the City's citation of Ralph L. Wadsworth Constr., Inc. v. 
West Jordan City, 2000 UT App 49, is unhelpful since the Citizens are not asking 
the Court to reach the merits of the Planning Commis ion decision. The Citizens 
are asking the Court to remand the matter back to the Planning Commission to 
conduct a meeting with the proper notice so that the Citizens can attend the 
meeting, and, if the Citizens disagree with the Planning Commission decision, so 
that they can appropriately appeal to the City Council. 
POINT III 
THE CITIZENS' CLAIMS ARE 
NOT MOOT4 
A decision in this appeal will protect the right of the Citizen's to be heard, 
and therefore affects the rights of the litigants. However, even if the Court finds 
that the Citizen's had no right to notice, this case clearly falls within the public 
interest exception of Utah's mootness doctrine. 
The City asserts that the Citizens must explicitly outline the additional 
restrictions they would ask the Planning Commission and/or City Council for. 
However, the City offers no legal authority for this position. The Citizens have 
4
 Although the Citizens disagree with many of the positions taken by the City they 
agree with the City's opinion that Wheeler is incorrect regarding the mootness of this 
case. Wheeler's arguments regarding the mootness of this case only contain points 
of view that were fully briefed by the Citizens previously, so this Reply is only to the 
City's mootness claims. 
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generally identified the restrictions they would request, but are under no legal duty 
to inform the City in this appeal of all the limitations they would like placed on 
Wheeler. When this matter is remanded the Citizens will propose to the Planning 
Conn nission and tl le City Council the i estrictioi is they \\ ant imposed. . . 
Next, the City alleges that because the Citizens did not seek injunctive 
relief that this is somehow fatal to the Citizens appeal though the City offers no 
Utah precedent foi this position [ Jtal 1 coi ir ts have i lot reqi lii ed that pi in ' ate 
Citizens, who may be of limited economic means and unable to afford a bond, 
must seek injunctive relief. 
The Ol\\s aigiiinciil thai since Wheeler has hull t(\ building the Court 
should not step in and require that Wheeler change the physical structure is 
contrary to Culbertson v. Board of County Commissioners of Salt Lake County, 
2001 I J 1 108, i]56, In Culbertson, as here, the local government and the party 
taking the illegal action were on notice of the Citizen's claims prior to the 
5
 The City offers four cases to support its allegation that the Citizens were required 
to seek injunctive relief and since they did not their claims are moot. City of New 
Orleans v. Bd. ofComm 'rs, 694 So.2d 975 (La. Ct. App. 1996) is not analogous to 
the case at bar since it was a case that involved a city suing a state agency, unlike 
here where private citizens are suing the city. Dreikausen v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals, 
11A N.E.2d 193 (N.Y. 2002) is a New York case, which state, unlike Utah, has had a 
judicial policy requiring injunctive relief in this type of case. Moreover, construction 
had already begun at the time the Plaintiffs in this case filed their action. Id. at 196. 
Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. DeVilbiss, 729 P.2d 353 (Colo. 1986) is not particularly 
helpful either since the Colorado Court limited its holding to that case. Id. at 360. 
Wells v. Lodge Props., Inc., 976 P.2d 321 (Colo. App. 1998) supports the Citizens 
position in that it found that the case was not moot, and reached the merits of the 
case. Id. at 323. 
9 
commencement of construction and thus not immunized from the later judicial 
determination.6 
In tandem with this argument the City claims that the Citizens made a 
calculated decision not to seek injunctive relief and that the Court cannot rule 
because of this choice of the Citizens. In support of this contention the City offers 
two cases which are distinct from the present case: Collins v. Sandy Board of 
Adjustment, 2000 UT App 371, \ 4 and Collins v. Sandy Board of Adjustment, 
2002 UT 77,^13. 
The Court of Appeals found that the Collinses made a deliberate decision 
not to appeal a determination of the District Court and await the outcome of 
another case in front of the Court of Appeals. That Court found that the decision 
not to appeal their case at the time of the District Court decision barred them from 
deciding the later appeal their case. The Collinses then turned to the Supreme 
Court. The Supreme Court found that issue preclusion also barred the Collinses 
from later appealing the determination of the District Court. Therefore, these 
cases were disposed of on res judicata grounds and are completely different from 
the claims of the Citizens here. 
6
 This case is much different from those cited by the City to support its position. In 
particular in Mernish v. H.A. Folson & Associates, 646 P.2d 731, 732 n. 3 (Utah 
1982) the only relief requested had already been satisfied, unlike the case at bar. 
Likewise, in McRae v. Jackson, 526 P.2d 1190,1192 (Utah 1974), and State v. Sims, 
881 P.2d 840, 841 (Utah 1994) there was no controversy left between the parties, 
unlike here where the controversy is ongoing. 
10 
The City completely ignores the reason that this case "is likely to recur . . . 
[and] capable of evading review/' Ellis v. Swensen, 2000 UT 101, f 26; namely 
that the City did not follow its own Ordinance. The City has an ordinance that 
requires notice, and notice was not gi\ ei I to the Citizens w hich in ti it i i affected the 
Citizens right to appeal. If the Court does not rule on whether it is okay for the 
City to ignore its own ordinance, there is no doubt that another litigant wih e^ 
baci Willi jiiolhei case arguing tlml lliur m\\\\ In he haml was likev •-;; K i irted. 
CONCLUSION 
The City's failure to give the Citizens notice of the Planning Commission 
meeting violated the City's own Zoning Ordinance I his \ iolation, in ti u ix 
prevented the Citizens from appealing the Planning Commission decision to the 
City Council which could have imposed materially different conditions on 
Wheeler's * T TP The issues in this case have not been mooted by W heeler's 
i ^ - K- Council can still impose conditions on the 
CUP beyond those now in effect. The Citizens' are entitled to have the decision of 
the Commission overturned. 
• I) A 1 ED this of August, 2004. 
BAIRD & JONES 
Attorneys for Plaintiff§/A^pellants 
Bruce R. Baird 
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